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A TRILEMMA FOR DIVINE COMMAND THEORY 
Mark C. Murphy 
In this paper I present a trilemma for any property identity version of divine 
command theory, that is, any version of divine command theory that asserts 
that the property being obligatory is identical to the property being com-
manded by God. It seems highly plausible that God's commanding acts are 
not entirely determined by other facts about the world. And it seems highly 
plausible that moral properties supervene on non-moral properties. But of 
these three claims - that being obligatory is identical to being commanded 
by God, that God's commands are not entirely determined by other facts 
about the world, and that the moral supervenes on the non-moral - one must 
be false. I argue that it is divine command theory that should be rejected, 
since rejecting either of the latter two undercuts what motivation there is to 
affirm divine command theory in the first place. 
A property identity divine command theory is a view that asserts at least 
the following: the property being obligatory is identical to the property 
being commanded by God.] This view has been defended by Adams,' 
and has been commended by Alston as one of the more promising formu-
lations of divine command theory.' (Unless otherwise noted, whenever I 
refer to divine command theory, or OCT, I am referring to the property 
identity formulation of the view.) My aim in this paper is to present a 
trilemma that poses an extremely serious threat to OCT. In Section 1 I set 
out what I take to be a weak and highly plausible view on the freedom of 
God's commanding acts. In Section 2 I set out in a summary fashion the 
doctrine of moral supervenience, according to which there are no differ-
ences in moral properties without differences in non-moral properties. In 
Section 3 I show that one must reject either DCT or the weak and highly 
plausible view on the freedom of God's commanding acts set out in Section 
1 or the doctrine of moral supervenience set out in Section 2. In Section 4 I 
argue that in the face of this trilemma it is DCT that ought to be rejected, at 
least in its property identity formulation. 
1. God's commanding acts are flat wholly determined by the world 
God is a free being. On most views, God could have refrained from creat-
ing anything at all; on all views, God could have created a world different 
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in some ways from the world that God actually created. Not only is God's 
action in creating a world free; God's action within the created world is 
free as well. God has intervened miraculously in the world, but God could 
have failed to intervene miraculously, or could have intervened miracu-
lously in different ways than God in fact did. 
Among God's free acts are acts of commanding: at least some divine 
commands are free. What I mean by saying that God has at least some 
freedom in commanding is that even if the world were in relevant respects 
otherwise the same, God might have given slightly different commands: 
God could have given an at least slightly smaller or larger number of such 
commands, or could have given commands at least slightly different in 
content, or could have given commands to an at least slightly different 
group of people. What God commands is not entirely fixed by the way the 
world otherwise is. 
Now, one might say: there is nothing objectionable about holding that 
God's commands are wholly fixed by the way the world otherwise is. For 
the way that the world otherwise is is determined by other free choices that 
God has made. Consider the following analogy. God is truthful. So God's 
assertions are wholly fixed by the way the world otherwise is. But that is 
no restriction on God's freedom, because the way the world otherwise is is 
determined by God's own free choices. 
The objection does not succeed. First, to assert is to perform a speech-
act with a mind-to-world direction of fit: in successful acts of assertion, one 
has to describe the world the way it is, so it is not surprising that the con-
tent of God's assertions would be fixed by the way the world is. But to 
command is to perform a speech-act with a world-to-mind direction of fit: 
commanding is thus not (wholly') constrained by the way the world is. So 
tlle fact that it is unsurprising that God's assertions are fixed by the way 
the world is would not make it less surprising that God's commands are 
fixed by the way the world is. 
Second, God's truthfulness in assertion constrains God, if at all, only in 
the following way: if God chooses to assert something tq somebody on 
some occasion, then what God asserts will be true. It does not, of itself, 
entail that God must assert anything, or to any specific person, or on any 
specific occasion. But to say that God's commands are wholly fixed by the 
other features of the world is to say that every relevant detail of God's 
commanding - not just the content, but whether, to whom, and on what 
occasions - is determined by those other features. 
Third: there are reasons to suppose that God's commands are not entire-
Iv determined bv other features of the world other than that it would con-
;titute a real co~straint on God's freedom. For it just seems massively 
implausible that other features of the world could entirely fix God's com-
mands. Think about it this way: how would we explain how it could be 
that the other features of the world entirely determine every last detail of 
God's commanding - whether God commands, on what occasions, to 
whom, and with what precise content? It seems tilat we would have to say 
something like the following: given the features of a world other than what 
God in fact commands in that world, it is either tile case that God lacks 
power to command other than God does in that world, or it is tile case that 
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God simply will not, perhaps on the basis of there being decisive reasons 
for God to command just as God does. It is hard to imagine that the for-
mer could be true: how could other features of the world limit God's 
power, so that God can give only that particular set of commands, on just 
the occasions that God gives them, and to just the people to whom God 
gives them? It is also hard to imagine how the latter could be true: how 
could it be simply impossible, true in no possible world whatever, that the 
reasons that God has for giving commands could leave God indifferent 
between one of two slightly different commands, so that God might choose 
to give either one? That God lacks any discretion in commanding in light 
of the other features of a world appears to be a highly implausible claim.5 
2. Moral properties supervene on non-mom I properties 
Moral properties supervene on non-moral properties. There is some con-
fusion over why this is so, and what modal strength this supervenience is 
supposed to have, and what the ultimate philosophical signi6cance of 
supervenience is, but there is no doubt whatever that it is a fixed constraint 
on any adequate accounts of the concept of the moral and of what proper-
ties are identified as moral properties that they recognize this truth. Here 
is Michael Smith: 
Everyone agrees that moral features of things supervene on their nat-
ural features. That is, everyone agrees that two possible worlds that 
are alike in all of their natural features must also be alike in their 
moral features; that the moral features of things cannot float free of 
their natural features. Moreover, everyone agrees that this is a plati-
tude; that it is an a priori truth. For recognition of the way in which 
the moral supervenes on the natural is a constraint on the proper use 
of moral concepts.6 
The supervenience relationship between moral and non-moral proper-
ties is susceptible to more than one interpretation: it can interpreted as 
either weak or strong supervenience. Following Kim, we can say that a set 
of properties A (the supervenient family) weakly supervenes on a set of prop-
erties B (the supervenience base) if and only if 
necessarily for any property F in A, if an object x has F, then there 
exists a property G in B such that x has G, and if any y has G it has F.' 
Again following Kim, we can say that a set of properties A strongly super-
venes on a set of properties B if and only if 
Necessarily, for any object x and any property F in A, if x has F, then 
there exists a property G in B such that x has G, and necessarily if any 
y has G, it has F.6 
If the supervenience relationship between moral and non-moral proper-
ties is that of strong supervenience, then it is an a priori truth that for any 
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item" i and any moral property M, if i has a moral property M, then there is 
a set of non-moral properties N that i exemplifies such that necessarily any 
item that exemplifies the properties in N will exemplify M. On the other 
hand, if the supervenience relationship is that of weak supervenience, then 
it is an a priori truth that for any item i and any moral property M, if an 
item i has moral property M, then there is a set of non-moral properties N 
that i has such that any item that has N will have M. The difference 
between the claims that the moral strongly supervenes on the non-moral 
and that the moral weakly supervenes on the non-moral consists simply in 
the modal strength of the condition that there be no difference in moral 
properties without some difference in non-moral properties. On strong 
supervenience, if an item has a certain moral property due to its having a 
certain set of non-moral properties, then any item in any possible world 
that has that set of non-moral properties in that world will have that moral 
property in that world. On weak supervenience, if an item has a certain 
moral property due to its having a certain set of non-moral properties in 
some possible world, then any item in that possible world that has that set 
of non-moral properties will have that moral property. 
3. A trilemma for OCT 
God's commanding acts are not entirely fixed by the other features of the 
world. Any adequate account of the moral must accommodate the super-
venience of the moral on the non-moral. But if OCT is true, this view of 
God's freedom in commanding is false or the moral does not supervene on 
the non-moral. Of these three theses - OCT, the doctrine of moral super-
venience, and God's freedom in commanding - at least one must be false. 
There is no consensus in favor of construing moral supervenience as 
strong rather than merely weak supervenience, or vice versa; we will there-
fore consider both possible readings, beginning with strong supervenience. 
Assume that OCT is true and that the moral strongly supervenes on the 
non-moral. Being obligatory thus strongly supervenes on the non-moral. 
Necessarily, then, whether an act is obligatory is wholly fixed by a set of 
properties that does not include being obligatory. Now, if OCT is true, 
then being obligatory just is being commanded by God. And so, by sub-
stitution, necessarily, whether an act is commanded by God is wholly fixed 
by a set of properties that does not include being commanded by God. It 
thus follows from the conjunction of OCT and the supervenience of the 
moral on the non-moral that God's commands are wholly fixed by features 
of the world other than those commands themselves. But to accept this last 
claim is to reject God's freedom in commanding. 
This, then, is a trilemma with respect to OCT: one must reject either 
OCT, the notion that the moral strongly supervenes on the non-moral, or 
God's freedom in commanding. Now, one might say: all that this shows is 
that the defender of OCT ought not allow that the supervenience of the 
moral on the non-moral is to be interpreted as strong supervenience. Some 
philosophers have held that moral supervenience is weak supervenience,1° 
and if moral supervenience is weak supervenience, then all that is entailed 
by the conjunction of OCT and the doctrine of moral supervenience is that 
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being commanded by God weakly supervenes on other features of the 
world. But the notion that being commanded by God weakly supervenes 
on other features of the world is not, the defender of OCT might insist, 
objectionable at all. For while God's commands are free, are not fixed by 
other features of the world, God's commands are also rational, for God is a 
rational commander. To be a rational commander is, at least in part, to 
exhibit consistency in commanding. So if in a world God commands cp-ing, 
then any act in that world that displays the relevant properties that cp-ing 
displays would also be commanded by God, on account of God's consis-
tency. To command cp-ing but to fail to command an act identical to cp-ing 
in all relevant properties is to command inconsistently. But God is surely a 
consistent commander, and so the weak supervenience of God's com-
mands on other features of the world is guaranteed by God's rationality in 
commanding. 
But the appeal to weak supervenience is unpcrsuasive for two reasons. 
The first is that there are good reasons to move beyond weak to strong 
supervenience as an account of moral supervenience. By weak superve-
nience alone, one who says that cp-ing is obligatory commits him- or herself 
to the view that there is a set of non-moral properties that cp-ing exempli-
fies, and any act of \jf-ing in this world that has that set of non-moral prop-
erties will also be obligatory. But when asked why having that set of non-
moral properties guarantees that \jf-ing will be obligatory in this world, but 
having that set of non-moral properties would not guarantee that an act of 
X-ing would be obligatory in some other world, surely there must be some 
answer: it will not be a brute fact. 11 But there are only two possibilities. 
Either the explanation is wholly in terms of non-moral properties - \jf-ing 
exhibits some non-moral property that X-ing does not, or vice versa - in 
which case the presence or absence of that non-moral property would be 
part of a base for strong supervenience.12 Or the explanation is at least 
partly in terms of moral properties, which would have to be grounded in 
non-moral properties, leading us back to the first possibility. So it is hard 
to escape the impression that a retreat from strong to weak moral superve-
nience would constitute a concession that OCT cannot adequately accom-
modate the formal features of moral concepts. 
A second, entirely independent reason that the move to weak superve-
nience does not save the defender of OCT is that it is part of the concept of 
the moral that it supervene not on individual but only on general proper-
ties. In Section 2 I quoted Smith's description of the consensus about the 
supervenience of the moral on the non-moral. In restating his point, he 
continues: 
If two possible worlds are alike in the kinds of individuals who occu-
py them, the motivations and aspirations they have, the extent to 
which the world lives up to their aspirations, their relative levels of 
well-being, and if the worlds are otherwise identical in natural 
respects as well, if they differ only in which particular individuals and 
objects have these various natural features, then there is a conceptual 
confusion involved in supposing that these worlds could differ in 
their moral standing.13 
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R. M. Hare's account, the locus classicus for treatments of supervenience in 
moral philosophy, is also the locus classicus for this view. 
The relevance of this point is that even if we allow the propriety of the 
move to weak moral supervenience, the fact that the supervenience base 
includes only general properties makes trouble for the defender of OCT. 
For while it is part of the concept of the moral that the moral weakly super-
venes on non-moral general properties, it is not a plausible thesis about 
God's commanding activity that God's commands must weakly supervene 
on non-moral general properties. For the only argument that God's com-
mands must weakly supervene on non-moral properties is that it is a con-
stituent of rationality in commanding that such commands display consis-
tency. But it is not a constituent of rationality in commanding that such 
commands exhibit consistency with respect to gelleral properties. It can be 
perfectly rational to issue a command to one party and to fail to issue that 
command to another party, even though those parties, and the acts com-
manded of them, differ in no relevant general property. 
Here is a case that illustrates this point. Suppose that I see a small child 
drowning, but I am a poor swimmer, and would botch the rescue. There 
are nearby two stronger swimmers, Jane and Tom, each of whom could 
surely save the child, but if both attempt to jump in, the attempt will be less 
likely to succeed: each will get in the other's way. So, I give a command: 
"Jane, jump in and save the child! Tom, stay on the bank!" This is a rea-
sonable act of commanding: I had a reason to command one and only one 
of them to save the child; but there was no relevant general property to dis-
tinguish Jane and Tom; so I gave a command that was not determined by 
their general properties. It was random; I just picked. There is no basis to 
think that God's commands, even though God is a supremely rational com-
mander, would always have reasons determined by general properties for 
issuing one command rather than another; we have no basis to think that 
God never just picks. 
If the supervenience basis for moral properties contains only non-moral 
general properties, then the weak supervenience of the moral on the non-
moral requires that an act be obligatory only if every other act that has the 
same relevant general non-moral properties is obligatory is well. But we 
have no basis to believe, and some basis to doubt, that the fact that an act is 
commanded by God entails that every other act that has the same relevant 
general properties is commanded by God as well. And so, in addition to 
the worries raised above about weak supervenience as an adequate 
account of the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral, it seems that 
OCT is unable to accommodate even the weak supervenience of the moral 
on the non-moral. 
4. How should we respond to the trilemma? 
Either OCT is false, or God wholly lacks freedom in commanding, or the 
moral does not supervene on the non-moral. We must embrace one of 
those disjuncts. We should embrace the first: the rejection of DCT. Part of 
the reason for this is that God's freedom in commanding and the superve-
nience of the moral on the non-moral are uncontroversial claims, affirmed 
28 Faith and Philosophy 
(so far as I can tell) by all those taking part in the debates over OCT, where-
as OCT is a highly contentious claim. But even if the defender of OCT 
should be inclined to dig in, it is worth noting that the defender of that 
view ultimately gains nothing by embracing one of the latter two disjuncts: 
for if he or she embraces either of the latter two disjuncts, he or she loses 
what motivation he or she had to affirm OCT in the first place. What moti-
vates the affirmation of OCT are sets of interlocking theological concerns 
and conceptual considerations, neither of which is alone enough to provide 
support for OCT. If one rejects God's freedom in commanding, the theo-
logical motivation for OCT is undercut. If one rejects moral supervenience, 
the conceptual analysis motivation for OCT is undercut. To attempt to 
save OCT by embracing one of these implications is self-defeating. 
The theological motivation that pushes toward OCT is, in the main, the 
aim of preserving God's sovereignty over the moral. If the moral is an 
autonomous domain, it may appear that God lacks adequate control over 
the moral; God's commands must fall in line with what is otherwise moral-
ly required. OCT sets things right from a theistic point of view by identify-
ing the moral, or at least that part of the moral that calls for moral agents' 
unflagging allegiance, with what God commands: the moral thus cannot 
constitute an independent constraint on God's commanding activity. But 
if we embrace the notion that God wholly lacks freedom with respect to 
God's commands, then it appears that what now generates a constraint on 
God is not the moral but the non-moral. For now the non-moral entirely 
determines God's commanding activity. If, then, the main part of the theo-
logical push for OCT is the preservation of God's sovereignty over morali-
ty, the force of this push is largely undercut by the admission that God 
lacks freedom in commanding. 
The considerations from conceptual analysis that militate in favor of OCT 
are that the formal and substantive features of God's commanding activity 
seem to coincide neatly with the formal and substantive features of obliga-
tion. There would be little temptation to identify being obligatory with 
being commanded by God unless there were substantial overlap between 
the extensions of these concepts, and there would be little temptation to 
identify being obligatory with being commanded by God unless these con-
cepts displayed similar formal features. But with the exception of their eval-
uative character, there is no formal feature that is as central to the grasp and 
employment of moral concepts as that of supervenience. The failure to 
exhibit the requisite supervenience relationship would be enough to disqual-
ify any property as a candidate for identification with some moral property; 
that the candidate property is being commanded by God does not improve 
matters a whit. So, while the rejection of God's freedom in commanding 
strips one of the motivation to offer a theistic account of obligation, the rejec-
tion of supervenience denies one the resources to make a plausible claim that 
what one is offering is really an account of obligation at all. 
One might, of course, consider tinkering with the doctrine of moral 
supervenience in order to produce a modified formulation of that doctrine 
that would enable the defender of DCT to avoid the trilemma. Consider, 
for example, the property identity version of DCT set out in Adams's 
recent work.'S Adams allows that God might have given commands that 
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differ from those that God in fact gave: God might have forbidden or per-
mitted euthanasia, and might have required or failed to require certain reli-
gious rituals.!6 If we ascribe to Adams an affirmation of the doctrine of 
moral supervenience as it was set out in Section 2, then Adams's views are 
subject to the trilemma. But one might note that while Adams explicitly 
endorses the view that an object's axiological properties - its goodness, its 
value, etc. - supervene on its non-axiological properties,!? he does not 
explicitly endorse the view that an act's deontic properties - its rightness, 
its obligatoriness, etc. - supervene on its non-deontic properties. Since I 
have understood OCT to be a view about the identity of deontic properties, 
not about the identity of axiological properties, if a defender of OCT 
refrains from endorsing the view that deontic properties supervene on 
non-deontic properties, then he or she will not find him- or herself trapped 
in the tri1emma.18 
It would be a very bad idea, though, for the defender of OCT to avoid 
the trilemma by modifying the doctrine of supervenience so that it 
excludes deontic properties from the supervenient family. The presump-
tion against tinkering in this way with the doctrine of supervenience is 
extremely high, because the overwhelming intuitive support for the notion 
that axiological properties supervene on non-axiological properties extends 
just as readily to the notion that deontic properties supervene on non-
deontic properties. Just as it appears straightforwardly obvious that one 
lacks a grip on the concept of goodness if one allows that two objects are 
alike in all non-axiological features yet holds that one is good but the other 
is not, it appears just as straightforwardly obvious that one lacks a grip on 
the concept of obligation if one allows that two acts are alike in all non-
deontic features yet holds that one of those acts is obligatory but the other 
is not. In the absence of a genuinely compelling reason to alter the stan-
dard formulation of the doctrine of moral supervenience, it would be sim-
ply an ad hoc maneuver, constituting special pleading on the part of the 
defender of OCT, to adjust the doctrine of moral supervenience to allow 
OCT to avoid the trilemma. 
How could one think that there could be compelling reason to adjust the 
doctrine of moral supervenience so that it does not apply to deontic prop-
erties? Perhaps what might tempt one in this direction is that we want to 
allow that God's commanding is free, and that what God commands us to 
do, we are obligated to do. In one possible world, God commands us to 
perform religious ritual Rl' and we are thus obligated to perform it; in 
another possible world, God commands us to perform a distinct ritual R2 
- though R2' in itself, differs from R1 in no morally relevant way - and 
we are thus obligated to perform R2' Our being obligated to perform one 
of these rituals or the other does not supervene, then, on the intrinsic fea-
tures of the rituals. But this is obviously no basis to adjust our views on the 
supervenience of deontic properties on non-deontic properties; we want to 
say here that the property that distinguishes the required ritual from the 
non-required ritual in each world is being commanded by God. But that 
appeal is precisely what the defender of a property identity formulation of 
OCT is barred from making. By identifying the property being obligatory 
with the property being commanded by God, defenders of the property 
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identity formulation of OCT remove the property being commanded by 
God from that set of non-moral properties on which the property being 
obligatory can supervene.'9 
The trllemma established in this paper is sufficient to kick the legs out 
from under OCT in its property identity formulation. To say that it under-
cuts OCT in its property identity formulation is obviously not to say that 
all formulations of OCT are thereby implausible. Other formulations of 
OCT - those built on relationships of supervenience or causation rather 
than identity, or those built on fundamental moral requirements to obey 
God - may be fully compatible with God's freedom in commanding and 
the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral. Whether these other for-
mulations are defensible, or are even sufficiently distinctive to count as 
versions of divine command theory,''' is a different question altogether. 21 
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1. There are alternative formulations of divine command theory; I discuss 
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2. See Robert Adams, "Divine Command Metaethics Modified Again," 
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3. See William Alston, "Some Suggestions for Divine Command 
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do not constitute anything like the absolute constraint on the content of com-
manding acts that the alleged analogy with assertive acts would suggest, 
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venes on stabbings' tending to cause bodily damage. Weak supervenience 
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wrong. But why would we not go for strong supervenience here? Not because 
there is some other world in which it is just brutely the case that what tends to 
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cause bodily damage is not prima facie wrong. Perhaps in this other possible 
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is a possibility for avoiding the trilemma that is left logically open by Adams's 
text. 
19. Note, by contrast, that there are a number of ways to accommodate 
God's freedom in commanding and the variability of moral requirements in 
light of God's conunands that do not require anything like the rejection of the 
standard understanding of the doctrine of moral supervenience. Here are a 
few. (1) One could defend a sllperucnience version of divine command theory, 
on which moral obligations supervene on divine commands. The superve-
nience of moral obligation on divine commands could account for the differ-
ences in moral obligation in terms of the differences in what God freely com-
mands. (2) One could defend a causal version of divine command theory, on 
which moral obligations are caused by divine commands. If God were to give 
different commands, different moral obligations would be brought about. (3) 
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other moral obligations ultimately result from a primitive obligation to obey 
God's commands. If God were to give different commands, the requirement to 
obey God's commands would generate different specific obligations. (4) One 
could, without defending any version of divine command theory, hold that it 
is a moral requirement to obey God. (One might hold, that is, that there is a 
moral requirement to obey God but that it is not the ultimate source of all other 
moral requirements.) If so, again, differences in God's commands would result 
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identifies being obligatory with being commanded by God, each is free to 
leave being commanded by God as a member of the set of non-moral proper-
ties on which the property of being obligatory supervenes. 
20. For an argument that the causal formulation of DCT is not sufficiently 
distinctive, see my "Divine Command, Divine Will, and Moral Obligation," 
Faith and Philosophy 15 (1998), pp. 3-27, pp. 14-15. 
21. Thanks to Phil Quinn, Trenton Merricks, Joe Shaw, and an anonymous 
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